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Abstract: 
In 2008, governments in many countries embarked on large fiscal expenditure programmes, 
with the intention to support the economy and prevent a more serious recession. In this study, 
the overall impact of a substantial increase in fiscal expenditure is considered by providing a 
novel analysis of the most relevant recent experience in similar circumstances, namely that of 
Japan in the 1990s. Then a weak economy with risk-averse banks seemed to require some of 
the largest peacetime fiscal stimulation programmes on record, albeit with disappointing 
results. The explanations provided by the literature and their unsatisfactory empirical record 
are reviewed. An alternative explanation, derived from early Keynesian models on the 
ineffectiveness of fiscal policy is presented in the form of a modified Fisher-equation, which 
incorporates the recent findings in the credit view literature. The model postulates complete 
quantity crowding out. It is subjected to empirical tests, which were supportive. Thus 
evidence is found that fiscal policy, if not supported by suitable monetary policy, is likely to 
crowd out private sector demand, even in an environment of falling or near-zero interest rates. 
As a policy conclusion it is pointed out that by changing the funding strategy, complete 
crowding out can be avoided and a positive net effect produced. The proposed framework 
creates common ground between proponents of Keynesian views (as held, among others, by 
Blinder and Solow), monetarist views (as held in particular by Milton Friedman) and those of 
leading contemporary macroeconomists (such as Mankiw). 
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“The increase in government purchases must be met by an equal decrease in [private] 
investment...” Mankiw (1994:62) 
 
  “Before Keynes, it was commonplace that government spending and taxation were powerless to 
affect the aggregate levels of spending and employment in the economy; they could only redirect 
resources from the private to the public sector. … The Keynesian demonstration … changed all 
this. Economists began to stress the macroeconomic effects of government spending and taxation. 
It became commonplace that not only would a dollar of additional government spending raise 
national income by the original dollar but that this expenditure would have multiplier effects of 
perhaps several dollars more. The old view that government spending simply crowded out private 
spending was banished.” 
Blinder and Solow (1973:319). 
 
 
1. Introduction: Why consider Japanese Fiscal Policy in the 1990s? 
 
In 2008, governments in many countries embarked on some of the largest fiscal 
expenditure programmes witnessed in many decades. The rationale is that fiscal 
expenditure is necessary to support the economy and prevent a serious recession or 
depression. Fiscal expenditure will be used to purchase equity in banks, purchase 
non-performing assets, compensate depositor losses and to engage in active government 
investment and spending programmes to stimulate demand. 
 
It is the purpose of this paper to throw light on these measures and in particular potential 
unintended consequences of the substantial increase in fiscal expenditure. The most 
relevant recent experience in similar circumstances is that of Japan in the 1990s: having 
fuelled a speculative bubble in the 1980s, the banking system became virtually insolvent 
during the 1990s and stopped lending, while asset prices collapsed. Already from 1992 
onwards the government thus set out on a multi-year fiscal stimulation programme, which 
amounted to one of the largest fiscal stimulation programmes in peacetime. To be sure, the 
programme started out more modestly, but when the desired effects could not be achieved, 
it was gradually expanded.   
 
Government policy documents described the rationale of the programme: fiscal spending 
needed to be increased, in order to boost domestic demand and stimulate the economy.
2 
                                                 
2  See the official statements at the announcement of stimulation packages. For instance: ‘Keikyuu keizai taisaku (youshi), 
16 November 1999, Economic Planning Agency (available at: www5.cao.go.jp/98/b/19981116b-taisakuyousi.html).   3
The first fiscal stimulation package was implemented in 1992. This was followed by a 
number of additional packages in every year, except 1996 and 2000. Table 1 lists the 
packages and supplementary budgets. As can be seen, ten fiscal stimulation packages 
amounted to Y146trn. Eighteen supplementary budgets were passed, amounting to 
Y38.1trn over a decade that often also saw a significant expansion in the regular budgets. 
 
Table 1.    Fiscal stimulation packages and supplementary budgets in the 1990s 
 
FY  91 92 93 94 95  96  97 98 99 00 Total 
No.  0 1 2 1 2  0  2 1 1 0 10  Fiscal 
stimulation 
packages 
Size 
(Ytrn) 
0  10.7 19.2 15.3 21.2  0  40.6 24.5 14.9  0  146.4 
No.  1 1 3 2 3  1  3 2 1 1 18  supplm. 
budgets 
Size 
(trn) 
0.3 -0.7 5.1 0.4 7.1  1.1  10.3  7.2 4.8 2.7 38.1 
Sources: Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
Since the government may have had political motives to overstate fiscal stimulation 
packages through double-counting, a more accurate measure of the fiscal stance may be 
total government expenditures, as calculated by the national income accounts (aggregating 
government consumption and investment, as well as inventory data). Government 
spending increased from a total of Y705 trn in the 1980s to Y1,136 trn in the 1990s. As a 
percentage of nominal GDP, this represented an increase from 20.9% on average in the 
1980s to 22.7% in the 1990s. On a growth basis the more positive fiscal stance during the 
1990s becomes more obvious: Table 2 shows the breakdown by contribution to growth of 
each GDP component. On average, government spending contributed almost half of 
growth in the 1990s, while it only contributed a sixth of growth in the 1980s. 
   4
 
Table 2.    Contribution to nominal GDP growth in the1990s 
 
CY 
% 
Consumption + 
Housing 
Capex 
(+Inventories) 
Net 
Exports  
Private 
Demand 
Government 
Consumption 
Government 
Investment  
(+Inventories) 
Total 
Government 
Nominal GDP 
1991  2.6   1.6   1.3  4.9  0.8  0.4   1.2  6.2 
1992  2.0   -1.6   0.8  0.8  0.8  1.2   2.0  2.6 
1993  1.7   -2.1   0.1  -0.6  0.7  1.2   1.8  1.0 
1994  2.1   -1.4   -0.2  0.4  0.5  0.2   0.7  1.1 
1995  0.3   0.8   -0.4  0.5  0.7  0.0   0.7  1.2 
1996  2.0   0.5   -0.3  1.6  0.5  0.5   1.0  2.6 
1997  0.2   1.9   1.4  2.6  0.4  -0.7   -0.4  2.2 
1998  -0.7   -1.1   1.2  -1.1  0.3  -0.3   0.0  -1.2 
1999  0.4   -1.3   -0.2  -1.4  0.4  0.2   0.6  -0.8 
2000  -0.2   1.1   -0.1  0.7  0.6  -0.8   -0.3  0.3 
1990s  ave.  1.0   -0.1   0.4  0.8  0.6  0.2   0.7  1.5 
1980s  ave.  3.4   1.5   0.3  5.2  0.8  0.2   1.0  6.2 
Source: Cabinet Office, December 2001   
 
 
While the government contribution to growth increased in the 1990s, government 
revenues fell significantly, as the weaker economy reduced tax revenues.
3 Consequently, 
Japan’s government registered the largest budget deficits of any industrial country in the 
postwar era, averaging over 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) during the period 
1993-2000.  
 
Textbooks tell us that there are two options to fund the revenue shortfall: debt-finance or 
money finance. In the former case, the government borrows from the private sector; in the 
latter, it either creates money directly, or borrows from the central bank, which pays by 
creating money.
4 In Japan’s case the issuance of legal tender has been delegated to the 
Bank of Japan, which, since at least the late 1970s, has in practice acted largely 
independently from the government. Moreover, the Finance Law does not allow the 
central bank to directly underwrite government bonds.
5 This has apparently left the 
                                                 
3  There were important tax reductions in 1994 and 1998. However, at other times, fiscal policy tightened. Hoshi and Patrick 
(2000) estimate that the 1997 ending of income tax rebates and the rise of the consumption tax from 3% to 5% increased 
government revenues by about two percentage points of GDP. 
4  Dornbusch and Fischer (1987) emphasise that “the distinction between selling debt to the public and selling it to the 
central bank is essential. The distinction between money and debt financing can be further clarified by noting that Treasury 
sales of securities to the central bank are referred to as monetizing the debt, meaning that the central bank creates 
(high-powered) money to finance the debt purchases” (p. 584). 
5  The central bank can purchase government bonds in the secondary market one year after issuance. Economically, this is 
equivalent to primary market purchase. The political circumstances are different, since the government may not be able to 
determine the extent to which bonds are purchased by the central bank. Despite legal lack of independence, since the 1970s 
the central bank has independently made this decision. See our discussion of monetary policy below.   5
government no choice but to fund the public sector borrowing requirement from the 
private sector, mainly via bond and bill issuance (Table 3).
6  
 
Table 3. Government Borrowing and Debt in the 1990s 
 
  Source: Bank of Japan 
 
 
New 
government borrowing increased by Y300.4 trn during the 1990s (58.6% of 2000 nominal 
GDP). This raised total outstanding debt to Y522.1trn by the end of 2000, amounting to 
101.8% of GDP. Adding the new borrowing of Y60.36trn during 2001, the national debt 
figures recorded a new high of Y 582.46trn, about 120% of GDP, by the end of 2001. The 
debt continued to rise during subsequent years. With Japan’s economy never fully 
recovering and growth remaining below potential for what will soon amount to twenty 
years, Japan has ever since been heading towards a debt/GDP ratio of 200%.
7 
 
 
                                                 
6  Indeed, the government’s borrowing is another measure of the stance of fiscal policy. 
7  Bloomberg reported on 31 March 2009 on the OECD’s forecasts for 2010: “Japan’s public debt is likely to surge to 197.3 
percent of gross domestic product next year, limiting the government’s ability to spend more to revive growth, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said. “With the debt ratio projected to approach 200 percent in 
2010, the scope for additional fiscal stimulus is limited,” the Paris-based organization said in a report today. “It will be 
important to focus again on fiscal consolidation as the economy stabilizes.” (Nonomiya, 2009).   
CY 
¥trn 
New borrowing  New 
borrowing/ 
nGDP 
Total 
Outstanding 
debt 
Total 
Outstanding 
debt/ nGDP 
1991  4.65 1.0% 226.35  47.7% 
1992  14.71 3.0% 241.06  49.9% 
1993  17.33 3.6% 258.38  53.0% 
1994  27.15 5.5% 285.53  58.0% 
1995  27.21 5.4% 312.74  62.3% 
1996  30.94 6.0% 343.68  66.7% 
1997  24.92 4.8% 368.60  70.9% 
1998  58.38 11.4% 426.98 83.2% 
1999  50.79 9.9% 477.76  92.9% 
2000  44.34 8.6% 522.10  101.8% 
Total 300.4  6.0%    6
2. The Literature on the Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy in the 1990s 
 
(a) ‘Fiscal Policy was Effective’ 
The question whether fiscal policy has been effective in stimulating Japan’s economy has 
triggered a lively debate. Since many economists in Japan would call themselves 
Keynesian, fiscal spending has many supporters.
8 The need for and usefulness of fiscal 
stimulation has, among others, been argued by Nagatani (1996), Yoshitomi (1996), Koo 
(1995, 1999), Posen (1998), Ito (2000) and Kuttner and Posen (2002).  
 
The Keynesian View 
The special case for fiscal policy effectiveness was made by Ito (2000), when short-term 
nominal interest rates had started approaching zero. He argued at the time that the 
economy was in a liquidity trap, the demand for money perfectly interest-elastic and the 
LM curve horizontal. Since interest reductions had not stimulated investment, he argued 
that investment was perfectly interest-inelastic and the IS curve vertical. Thus monetary 
policy would be ineffective and fiscal policy unusually effective, without any crowding 
out. Hence Ito advocated further fiscal stimulation as being effective in such a zero interest 
environment.
9  
 
There is a theoretical problem with this argument, as well as an empirical one. By arguing 
for a horizontal LM curve, describing the case of short-term nominal interest rates that 
have fallen to such low levels that they do not fall further, Ito restricts his argument to time 
periods that exclude the entire decade of the 1990s – during this decade interest rates did 
indeed fall steadily.   
 
An empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of fiscal policy also depends on the size of the 
expected impact of fiscal expenditures. While the Keynesian model implies a ‘multiplier’, 
such that Y1trn of fiscal expenditures would result in a rise in economic activity larger 
than Y1trn, many proponents of fiscal policy effectiveness have adopted a far more 
cautious approach to fiscal policy effectiveness. Downplaying second and third-round 
effects entirely, most proponents emphasized the role of the primary impact: To estimate 
the expected impact of fiscal policy, many government and private sector economists 
therefore often argued that a public works project worth Y1trn would boost nominal GDP 
by Y1trn. A spending package amounting to 2% of GDP was commonly expected to boost 
                                                 
8  The ineffectiveness of fiscal stimulation has probably rendered many supporters of fiscal spending less vocal by the late 
1990s. 
9  “So far, a straight Keynesian prescription applies” (Ito, 2000, p. 102).   7
GDP by 2 percentage points.
10 
 
Concerning the empirical evidence, Posen (1998) and Kuttner and Posen (2002) argue that 
fiscal policy has been effective in Japan during the 1990s. In his view, actual fiscal 
spending has been smaller than the headline figures for the packages. The authors argue 
that fiscal spending has not been sufficiently large to stimulate the economy. A suitably 
sized fiscal expansion would, in this view, have been effective in ending economic 
stagnation and deflation. According to Posen (1998), when the actual spending reached 
substantial size in 1995, a recovery followed (in 1996).
11 In other periods, there was no 
sizeable fiscal stimulation, according to him. However, actual GDP-based expenditure 
data or statistics for the government borrowing requirement yield reasonably accurate 
measures of the fiscal stance. Using such figures, as cited above, we find that sizeable 
fiscal stimulation did take place and that it failed to stimulate the economy.   
 
Ito (2000) also remains convinced of the effectiveness of fiscal policy. While he concedes 
that the unprecedented six fiscal stimulation packages that were implemented between 
1992 and 1994 have had “little impact” (p. 102), he argues that this does not prove fiscal 
policy ineffectiveness, as defined by him. In principle, two definitions of effectiveness are 
possible. One is a mutatis mutandis requirement for effectiveness, defining it as the ability 
to create significant positive economic growth. This is the strictest definition, and the one 
that matters to policy-makers, investors and the population at large. In the first half of the 
1990s, most private sector economists, forced to make mutatis mutandis forecasts, 
predicted significant economic recoveries, mainly based on the sizeable fiscal stimulation. 
However, this did not happen. Thus, by their original definition, fiscal policy was 
ineffective.  
 
There is another definition of policy effectiveness, which is employed by Ito (2000). It is 
based on the ceteris paribus assumption:   
                                                 
10  This was the most common calculation, used by Japanese private sector research institutions, as well as key government 
agencies. See, for instance, the Economic Planning Agency’s Nagatani (1996), who argued in favour of fiscal stimulation, 
because “Even when the ripple-on effect is zero, fiscal stimulation policy will still at least have the ‘direct effect’, which is 
that Y1 trn of increase in public investment will result in a Y 1 trn in GDP increase”. 
11  Posen follows a calculation common in financial markets in Tokyo, namely to distinguish between investment that “adds 
to demand” – so-called mamizu – and that which does not. The mamizu is defined as including increased public spending 
and tax cuts. Loan programmes offered by government-affiliated institutions to the private sector and funded by postal 
savings deposits investment is deemed not to add to demand, but merely reallocating funding among various projects. The 
important insight from this distinction is the necessity to distinguish between government spending that increases net 
purchasing power in the economy, and government spending that merely reallocates existing purchasing power. However, 
the way this is attempted by the mamizu calculation is flawed. A meaningful distinction must focus on the credit creation 
process and include the central bank and the banking system, rendering true mamizu the monetized part of fiscal policy (see 
below).    8
 
“Without any fiscal stimulus, the economy undoubtedly would have contracted. The 
underlying economy was so weak that fiscal stimulus did not bring the economy all the way 
to its potential growth rate but it arguably kept things from becoming worse” (p. 102).   
 
Supporters of the efficacy of fiscal spending, including Posen (1998), feel that even more 
fiscal stimulation is the solution for Japan.
12  The difficulty of establishing clear-cut proof 
is apparent: the ceteris paribus condition is invoked, only to claim its violation. The 
argument relies on counter-factual analysis: things would have been worse without the 
fiscal spending. Ito indeed relies on unspecified shocks, rendering economic growth 
exogenous to fiscal and monetary policy.
13 These undefined exogenous shocks cannot be 
isolated or quantified. What is worse, by invoking a violated ceteris paribus assumption, 
the fiscal policy effectiveness claim cannot be falsified – it leaves the realm testable 
hypotheses.
14  Ito’s claim appears to be an attempt at reconciling inconvenient facts with a 
theory through the use of ad hoc assumptions about exogenous shocks. Even leaving aside 
whether or not these assumptions are permissible, such an exercise cannot be construed as 
constituting supportive empirical evidence.   
 
Thus the only empirical study offering empirical evidence supporting the argument that 
fiscal policy has been effective is Kuttner and Posen (2002). However, their findings stand 
in sharp contrast to other empirical work, and they suffer from a number of 
methodological problems. Most importantly, their model does not include a monetary 
variable, as their VAR identifying assumption is that monetary policy does not affect the 
economy contemporaneously (while fiscal policy does). Since they use annual data, this 
appears to be a problematic assumption, also in the light of the empirical evidence 
presented below. Their empirical estimates are not tested for robustness or encompassing 
when tested in direct comparison with alternative models 
 
                                                 
12  Ito follows Posen’s (1998) recommendations and suggests further stimulation in the form of lasting income tax cuts and 
tax incentives to stimulate private housing investment. Ito (2000), pp. 103ff. 
13  Ito recognizes this, but leaves the questions raised unanswered. “The question remains as to what prevented the economy 
from getting back on a self-sustained growth path. Was it the series of bad shocks? Or has the dynamic spill-over effect of 
fiscal packages become smaller in the 1990s? Or was the amount of actual stimulus smaller than generally recognized?” (Ito, 
2000, p. 102). No attempts at answers follow. 
14  This line of reasoning falls far short of Popper’s methodological principles. It may well be in the tradition of deductivist 
economics, which takes little interest in empirical evidence and concludes from any gap between theory and reality that the 
latter needs changing, not the former. However, it defies common sense. Nevertheless, even in the absence of omniscience 
concerning exogenous shocks, it is possible to test hypotheses concerning the cause of potential fiscal policy ineffectiveness 
(see below).   9
(b) ‘Fiscal Policy was Ineffective’ 
 
The majority of researchers take the view that fiscal policy has disappointed. Empirical 
studies by Bayoumi (2001), Dalsgaard, André and Richardson (2001) and Perri (1999) 
found that fiscal policy had only very small positive effects. IMF (1998), as well as 
Ramaswamy and Rendu (2000) even found that public consumption had a negative impact 
on economic activity in the 1990s.   
 
Several arguments have been proposed over the years why fiscal policy may be ineffective. 
In the case of the Japanese economy, three types of arguments were made. All three point 
out that the simple first-round positive effects of fiscal policy may be partially or 
completely negated by negative effects that result from the need of the government to 
procure the money in order to fund the fiscal expenditure. The first is based on a 
Keynesian relationship between interest rates and investment and argues that crowding out 
of fiscal expenditure may occur via higher interest rates. The second is based on a 
reduction in consumption and an increase in savings that is induced by increased fiscal 
spending. It is commonly referred to as ‘Ricardian equivalence’. The third is based on a 
modified credit view and emphasizes the link – or lack thereof – of fiscal and monetary 
policy. The first two views will be reviewed briefly below, before the third is analysed, 
applied and tested in greater detail. 
 
Interest Rate-Based Crowding Out 
During the 1960s, with the rise of the Keynesian paradigm, fiscal policy had been given 
prominence in policy-making in the US and many European countries. This was justified 
with the Keynesian government expenditure multiplier analysis. However, in the late 
1960s and until the end of the 1970s, a growing body of literature pointed out that such 
analysis was misguided, as it focused only on the initial-stage multiplier effect. An 
analysis of the complete multiplier would have to include the question of how the budget 
deficit is financed, and incorporate the effects of such finance. Christ (1968), Blinder and 
Solow (1973), Hansen (1973) and others showed that for bond-financed deficit spending, 
the stimulative effect of fiscal policy is smaller than that derived in traditional Keynesian 
models that do not take funding into consideration.
15  The crowding out effect of increased 
government expenditure via higher interest rates is reflected in standard Keynesian models 
and the IS-LM synthesis, but also the mainstream monetarist models (such as Friedman, 
1956, Brunner and Meltzer, 1976).
16  While they differ in the size of the net effect of fiscal 
                                                 
15  Their work was preceded by Lerner (1943) who rejected debt-financed deficits entirely. 
16  While proto-monetarist formulations did not rely on interest rates, but the equation of exchange, as outlined below, and   10
policy, they agree that the transmission mechanism (and potential crowding out) occurs via 
interest rates. Indeed, the substantial literature on the possibility and size of crowding out 
of debt-financed fiscal expenditure has in common that it centers on interest rates as the 
adjustment mechanism.
17 What all these formulations (classical, neo-classical Keynesian 
and post-Keynesian) have in common is that the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy is the 
result of increased interest rates. 
 
In the case of Japan it was indeed argued by some economists during the first half of the 
1990s that increased bond issuance to fund fiscal spending would lower bond prices and 
push up long-term interest rates. This rise of interest rates would negatively affect 
investment and economic activity, it was said. A proponent of this interest rate-based 
crowding out argument is, for instance, Yoshida (1996), who additionally warned that the 
long-term interest rate rises would tend to strengthen the yen and hurt net exports.   
 
The main problem with these interest-rate based arguments for fiscal policy 
ineffectiveness is that there is no empirical evidence in their support.
18 Despite brief 
periods of rising long-term nominal rates, nominal short-term (as measured by call rates) 
and long-term interest rates (as measured by ten-year government bond yields) have 
trended down during the 1990s. There are only two instances where they rose: from 4.3% 
on average in 1993, to 4.4% in 1994, and from 1.3% in 1998 to 1.8% in 1999. However, in 
both cases rates subsequently resumed their decline to new lows (see Figure 1).
19  
 
Calculating real interest rates as the difference between these nominal interest rates and 
consumer price inflation (as measured by the CPI), we find that short-term real interest 
rates fell from 4.2% on average in 1991 to 0.11% on average in 2000, while long-term real 
interest rates fell from 3.0% on average in 1991 to 0.7% in 1998, though rising again to 
2.5% on average in 2000. These real rates were lower than during the 1980s. These facts 
contradict interest rate crowding out arguments.   
                                                                                                                                                   
early monetarists (wisely?) said little about the precise transmission mechanism between money and the economy, later 
monetarist models (such as Friedman, 1956, Brunner and Meltzer, 1976) accepted the Keynesian interest-elasticity of the 
demand for money and thus argued that the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy relies on perverse wealth effects associated with 
bond-financed government spending, operating via interest rates (see Blinder and Solow, 1973). Since interest rates failed to 
rise during the 1990s, such later monetarist models are not suitable to explain the Japanese experience and will not be 
discussed further. 
17  See Christ (1968), B. Friedman (1978), Blinder and Solow (1973), Ludvigson (1996),Those who argued that ‘portfolio 
crowding in’ may offset ‘transactions crowding out’ and thus produce either a positive or ambiguous effect of debt-funded 
fiscal stimulation (such as B. Friedman, 1978) do not contribute towards finding an answer to the phenomenon observed in 
Japan during the 1990s, namely no significant rises in interest rates, but also no significant effect of fiscal stimulation. 
18  Examples of empirical studies of the link between fiscal policy and interest rates in the US are Hutchison and Pyle (1984) 
and Hoelscher (1986). For examples and reviews of empirical work on the influence of fiscal policy on aggregate demand, 
see, for instance, Aschauer (1985) and Tatom (1985).   
19  The annual average of the prime lending rate has declined every single year during the 1990s.   11
 
Invoking a violated ceteris paribus definition of crowding out, the theoretical argument 
might be conceivable that the fall interest rates happened despite the crowding out, and as 
a result of exogenous shocks, without which interest rates would have risen. Just as with 
the argument that fiscal policy was effective in Japan during the 1990s, as without it things 
would probably have been worse, proponents of this view are faced with the difficulty of 
having to isolate the exogenous shocks needed to justify the absence of interest rate rises.
20 
Furthermore, this exercise in attempting to reconcile the contradictory empirical record 
with the theory through the use of auxiliary assumptions cannot be construed as 
constituting supportive empirical evidence. Thus the fact remains that the argument of 
interest rate based crowding out is not supported by the empirical record. Given the 
historical and dramatic declines in short, long, nominal and real interest rates, it can be 
safely said that few, if any observers seriously entertain the interest rate crowding out 
argument.
21   
 
Ricardian Equivalence 
Another case for a different kind of crowding out has been made by Krugman (1998). 
Applying his model of inter-temporally optimizing rational representative agents to Japan, 
he obtains Ricardian equivalence of the type Barro (1974) proposed: Japanese consumers 
believe that any fiscal spending funded by the issuance of government debt (as most of it 
has been) will require the debt to be fully paid off in the relevant future by raising taxes on 
individuals. Then for every yen in government spending, rational consumers would 
increase savings by one yen - preparing the money to repay the government in the future.   
 
One analytical problem with this model is that it does not allow for the possibility that the 
debt will be paid off by other means - such as money creation, higher corporate taxes, 
economic growth that boosts tax revenues without raising individual taxes, or asset sales 
to foreign investors. It is not clear why rational consumers would not consider these 
possibilities, especially in a deflationary economy operating below the full employment 
                                                 
20  McKibbin (1996) engages in this difficult exercise, making use of a multi-country structural model to endogenise shocks 
to the Japanese economy. Pointing out the anticipated nature of the fiscal spending packages (and their partial 
overstatement), he concludes: “Rather than stimulating the economy, these fiscal measures acted to further slow economic 
activity as well as appreciate the real exchange rate” (p. 37). In McKibbin’s model, the announcement effect of fiscal 
stimulation occurs immediately, appreciating the exchange rate and real long-term interest rates, while the positive effect 
occurs later, or to a lesser extent than announced (due to overstatement of the package). However, only data through 1995 is 
used, thus missing much of the 400 basis point drop in long-term interest rates over three-and-a-half years, from about 4.7% 
in February 1995 to 0.7% in October 1998, not to mention the further drop to 0.43 by June 2003. 
21  Walker (2002:286), for instance, says: “The possibility of a crowding-out effect of government spending on investment is 
dismissed ex ante, given Japan’s low real interest rates in recent years”.   12
level.
22  
 
Another problem is that the assumptions on which this argument is based are restrictive. 
Thus if there is a simpler explanation (as will be presented below), the fundamental 
principles of logic suggest that it would be preferable. Meanwhile, the empirical record of 
the Ricardian equivalence argument remains important to assess its relevance. The most 
basic test of Ricardian equivalence would be a comparison of the change of household 
savings and government expenditure or borrowing within a fully specified savings function. 
Proponents of this explanation of fiscal policy ineffectiveness have not provided such 
evidence, as far as the author is aware.
23 Indeed, Walker (2002: 286) holds that “It seems 
unlikely that anything as austere as full Ricardian equivalence would obtain in the real 
world.”
24 We therefore proceed to the third possible explanation of why fiscal policy 
appears to have been ineffective in Japan during the 1990s. 
 
 
3. An Alternative Explanation of Fiscal Policy Ineffectiveness 
 
(a) Theory 
Standard theories of fiscal policy ineffectiveness have difficulties when applied to Japan 
during the 1990s. There is no support for the classical, neo-classical, IS-LM synthesis and 
                                                 
22  The argument that debt could be paid for by non-inflationary money creation cannot be handled by the type of models 
Krugman refers to, because due to further assumptions, including perfect information, they do not allow for the possibility 
of less than full employment output. With record-high unemployment and a ten-year recession in Japan, the relevance of 
such models is not obvious.   
23  If the fiscal stimulus takes the form of tax reductions for individuals and not increased government spending, then 
savings increase, while consumption remains unchanged - as the higher disposable income is not used for spending. If the 
fiscal stimulus takes the form of increased government spending on investment projects, incomes will not necessarily rise, 
thus consumption may not necessarily rise. But savings would rise. Since fiscal stimulation took the form of a combination 
of government spending and income tax changes (with the emphasis being clearly on government spending, though), the 
expected movement of consumption would be ambiguous with Barro-Ricardian equivalence. But the behaviour of savings 
would unambiguously have to be counter-directional to the movement of government borrowing. 
24  Walker (2002) also fails to test Ricardian equivalence directly. Instead, noting the low fiscal multipliers for Japan in the 
1990s, he proposes a theory according to which the fiscal multiplier declines the larger the level of the budget deficit. He 
argues that government spending does exert a wealth effect on consumption, but one that is “proportionate to the amount of 
waste in the budget”. Without providing empirical evidence, Walker assumes that “the average quality of public spending 
decreases with the level of spending”. Walker finds a positive fiscal multiplier, contradicting Ricardian equivalence. Making 
a number of auxiliary assumptions, Walker defines as a large fiscal deficit one that amounts to more than 6 or 7% of output 
and finds that “there is a threshold beyond which the effectiveness of fiscal spending falls off sharply” (p. 298). There is no 
test for robustness of these findings over different time periods or in other countries. Further, Walker says nothing about the 
mechanism by which the effectiveness of fiscal spending is reduced. Walker really argues that since fiscal policy was 
ineffective in Japan in the 1990s, and since it was large, it must have been too large to be effective. Thus, the main question 
of concern, namely why steady and significant fiscal stimulation during the 1990s failed to trigger a significant and 
sustained economic recovery, remains unanswered: by arguing that fiscal policy was too large to be effective, Walker 
neglects to explain why fiscal policy, when it was not too large (and not too small), also failed to produce the desired results. 
Finally, Walker fails to address previous literature that discussed the issue of the absolute size of fiscal deficits and 
government debts. Most previous theories failed to attach much significance to the size of the fiscal deficit or national debt. 
One early example is Lerner’ s (1943: 47) case that “the absolute size of the national debt does not matter at all”.   13
monetarist models which argue for crowding out of private demand due to debt-funded 
fiscal expenditure via a rise in interest rates. Similarly, there is no empirical support for the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, which does not require a rise in interest rates and argues 
that consumers spontaneously reduce their spending and increase savings to match any 
increase in government expenditure.   
 
In order to adequately explain the Japanese experience since the early 1990s, a theory is 
therefore required which allows for crowding out of fiscal expenditure, without the need 
for interest rates to rise, but also without relying on the empirically less plausible 
Ricardian equivalence argument (of perfectly foresighted savers replacing government 
expenditure with savings yen by yen).   
 
This suggests that an older strand of literature, which in accordance with Blinder and 
Solow (1973) could be called “pre-Keynesian”, or alternatively “proto-monetarist”, may 
be reconsidered. One feature of this older literature is that it focuses directly on the link 
between fiscal and monetary policy. Indeed, the debates about fiscal policy effectiveness 
have centered on bond-financed deficits. The possibility of money-financed fiscal 
expenditure appears to have been neglected.
25 While this may reflect the changed 
institutional environment of the past decade or so, where central banks have become 
independent, this does not eliminate the possibility of central bank cooperation with 
government policy or the need to analyse it. The neglect of the possibility of 
money-financed fiscal expenditure is all the more surprising as the literature had always 
agreed unanimously that fiscal policy, if funded this way, will be effective:   
 
“There is no controversy over government spending financed by printing money. Both sides 
agree that it will be expansionary; but one group likes to call it fiscal policy, while the other 
prefers to call it monetary policy. Nothing much hinges on this distinction.” Blinder and 
Solow (1973: 323). 
 
Pre-Keynesian and Early Keynesian Views 
Irving Fisher’s (1911) model does not rely on the monetary transmission through interest 
rates. Instead, it relies on direct quantity-based crowding out of private demand, due to 
increased claims on limited stocks of money by the government. Later monetarist models 
adopted the Keynesian argument of an interest-based investment function and thus came 
to rely on interest-based crowding out of private demand. However, some of Friedman’s 
                                                 
25  Ludvigson (1996) seems representative in his neglect of this possibility.   14
writings indicate that he continued to sympathize with Fisher’s quantity-based crowding 
out: “I regard the description of our position as “money is all that matters for changes in 
nominal income and for short-run changes in real income” as an exaggeration but one that 
gives the right flavor of our conclusions”, he said as late as 1970 (Friedman, 1970: 217).  
 
“On the transmission mechanism from money supply changes to income changes, Friedman 
supported Fisher’s direct transmission mechanism – from money supply changes directly to 
expenditures changes – over the indirect one – from money supply to interest rates to 
investment – in Keynesian and IS-LM models”, says Handa (2000: 365).
26  
 
This direct transmission of money to the economy, and consequent quantity-based 
crowding out of fiscal expenditure was also supported by the so-called ‘St. Louis 
monetarists’ (Handa, 2000: 370). They argue that government spending financed by bonds 
must be ineffective, because the money supply is left unaltered. Empirical evidence in 
support of this contention have been provided by Andersen and Jordan (1968), Andersen 
and Carlson (1970) and Keran (1969, 1970). This view was indeed “commonplace” before 
Keynes (see the introductory quote). 
 
But even Keynes was aware of the importance of the way government expenditure is 
funded. Before Keynes developed the liquidity preference theory, he was more concerned 
with Fisher-type quantity equations (see Keynes, 1930). In 1929, he argued that 
stimulatory fiscal expenditure should be funded by monetary expansion (Klein, 1968). 
Crucially, Keynes emphasized (in 1929) that the central bank could negate the effect of 
stimulatory fiscal policy and therefore “ensure that the expenditure financed by the 
Treasury was at the expense of other business enterprise” (Keynes, 1932:126). A simple 
model emulating the ‘pre-Keynesian’ or ‘proto-monetarist’ conception of the role of fiscal 
policy is presented below. 
 
Following the income version of Fisher’s quantity equation, this ‘common view’ held that 
nominal GDP (PY) is endogenous to the money supply (with velocity V being constant) 
and can be written as in equation (1), where we have followed the convention to place the 
endogenous variable on the left-hand side: 
  
(1)    PY = MV 
                                                 
26  As a result, “Friedman stands out in arguing that fiscal policy does not have strong effects on the economy…” 
(Dornbusch and Fischer, 1987: 671). “Fisher comes close to asserting that only changes in the quantity of money affect the 
price level; Friedman is more clear in arguing that other factors can affect the price level, but that these other factors are of 
secondary importance” (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1987:241).     15
 
Considering changes (so that the constant velocity drops out), we can rewrite this to state 
that nominal GDP growth is equal to money supply growth (or proportional in weaker 
versions): 
 
(2)     ∆(PY) = V∆M 
 
It follows that any exogenous increase in a component of nominal GDP (such as in G) 
cannot affect total nominal GDP, if the money supply remains unaltered: with ∆M = 0, and 
breaking down nominal GDP (PY) into nominal consumption c, nominal government 
expenditure g, nominal investment i and nominal net exports nx, we obtain: 
 
(3)  ∆M = 0 
 
(4)  ∆(PY) = ∆c + ∆i + ∆g + ∆nx 
 
(5)  ∆g = – (∆c + ∆i + ∆nx) 
 
Equation (5) indicates that, following Say’s Law, each dollar of additional government 
spending must crowd out exactly one dollar of private spending. The change in 
government expenditure ∆g is countered by a change in private sector expenditure of equal 
size and opposite sign. Thus the level of aggregate income will be unchanged and the 
multiplier for bond-financed government spending is zero. Notice that this conclusion is 
not dependent on the classical assumption of full employment. Instead of the employment 
constraint, the economy can be held back by a lack of money. Fiscal policy can thus crowd 
out private demand even in the context of less than full employment. Furthermore, the 
original formulation of Fisher, favoured also by Friedman, does not include interest rates 
and thus does not require crowding out via higher interest rates. Instead, the direct quantity 
effect of the government using up money that will not be available for spending by the 
private sector is sufficient. Equation (5) shows that without an increase in the money 
supply, a rise in government expenditure must result in an equal reduction in private 
demand, leaving nominal GDP unaltered and fiscal policy completely ineffective. As 
Milton Friedman put it:   
 
“The quantity theory implies that the effect of government deficits or surpluses depends critically 
on how they are financed. If a deficit is financed by borrowing from the public without an increase 
in the quantity of money, the direct expansionary effect of the excess of government spending   16
over receipts will be offset to some extent, and possibly to a very great extent, by the indirect 
contractionary effect of the transfer of funds to the government through borrowing. … If a deficit 
is financed by printing money, there will be no offset, and the enlarged stock of money will 
continue to exert an effect after the deficit is terminated. What matters most is the behavior of the 
stock of money, and government deficits are expansionary primarily if they serve as the means of 
increasing the stock of money; other means of increasing the stock of money will have closely 
similar effects.”
27  
 
However, this explanation suffers from a significant empirical obstacle: it is 
well-documented that macroeconomic models based on the quantity equation and 
predicated on the assumption of constant velocity have suffered from “recurring bouts of 
instability” (Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990: 349): Significant declines in velocity (and hence a 
“breakdown” in the money demand function) have been observed in a large number of 
countries since the 1980s, including the UK, the US, Scandinavian countries, and Japan. 
The previously stable relationship between M and PY “increasingly came apart at the 
seams during the course of the 1980s” (Goodhart, 1989). As a result, the usefulness of the 
quantity equation has declined significantly. “Once viewed as a pillar of macro-economic 
models, it is now widely regarded as one of the weakest stones in the foundation” 
(Boughton, 1991). The instability of velocity and hence the lack of a stable relationship 
between monetary aggregates (such as M0, M1, M2 or M3) and nominal GDP has also 
been recognized in the case of Japan (see, for instance, Ishida, 1984, Bank of Japan, 1988, 
Miyao, 1996, Yamada, 2000, and Kimura, 2001).   
 
A modern version 
A suggestion has been made to address the problem of the apparent velocity decline. It has 
been pointed out that originally Fisher (1911) referred to a transactions equation, which 
states that the amount of money changing hands to pay for transactions during a given 
time period must equal the nominal value of these transactions. Considering growth, this 
can be written as follows: 
 
 (6)  ∆(PQ) = V∆M 
 
where M stands for money actually used for transactions and PQ stands for the value of 
these transactions. Now considering only those transactions constituting GDP (denoted as 
PRY), we can write: 
 
                                                 
27  Milton Friedman, in his entry under Money: Quantity Theory in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, p. 476.   17
(7)   ∆(PRY) = V∆MR 
 
where MR stands for the money used for transactions that are part of GDP.
28 Thus the 
value of GDP transactions can only increase, if there is an equal increase in the money 
used for them. When attempting to employ actual statistics to represent this equation of 
exchange, we have no difficulty in using nominal GDP, as calculated by the national 
income accounts, for PRY. However, we find that traditional measures of the ‘money 
supply’ (such as M1, M2, etc.) do not measure money actually used for GDP transactions, 
but instead subsets of the stock of savings. Thus when money used for financial 
transactions increases relative to GDP, the traditionally measured velocity will appear to 
decline. This has been pointed out by Spindt (1985), Allen (1989, 1994), Howells and 
Biefang-Fisancho Mariscal (1992) and Werner (1992, 1997). Thus a measure of the money 
supply should be used that can be disaggregated, so that it can abstract from money used 
for non-GDP transactions. The Bank of England has long used the ‘credit counterparts’ 
approach as an alternative measure of the stock of money. An emphasis on credit 
counterparts, as opposed to deposit aggregates, is in line with the expanding literature on 
the ‘credit view’ or ‘bank lending school’, which argues that credit should not be neglected 
in macroeconomic analysis, as it may be at least constitute a supplementary transmission 
mechanism for monetary policy, if not more.
29  
 
Since bank credit extension creates the deposits that are usually considered in so-called 
money supply measures, it is valid to utilize the credit counterparts in the quantity 
equation (this and the following part were first argued by Werner, 1992, 1997). This 
addresses weaknesses of the previous formulation: Using credit to represent money M in 
the equation of exchange (6) and (7) allows us to measure the purchasing power actually 
used for transactions at any moment in time, as well as to disaggregate it into credit used 
for GDP transactions (MR) and that used for non-GDP transactions (such as real-estate and 
other speculative transactions).   
 
Using credit creation to measure M, equation (6) indicates that economic growth is only 
possible, if credit is created either via the banking system or the central bank, and used for 
transactions that are part of GDP. Interest rates are not part of the model. This feature of 
Fisher’s (1911) model can today be explained with further reference to the ‘credit view’ 
                                                 
28 Following  Werner  (1997). 
29  See, for instance, Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995), Kashyap and Stein (1997). It is noteworthy that most of this literature does however not explicitly address the ability 
of banks to create credit, and thus considers banks largely as financial intermediaries with the function to transfer funds from 
A to B, comparable to the capital markets. This is not how banks are considered in this paper, as their ability to create credit, 
through the well-known credit creation process, should be taken into consideration.   18
literature: Relaxing the assumption of perfect information, it has been shown that the 
credit market may not clear. Markets that do not clear are rationed and hence determined 
by quantities (following the ‘short-side principle’: whichever of supply or demand is 
smaller will determine the market outcome). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued that due to 
the skewed incentive structure of the institutional set-up of limited liability for directors, 
there is likely to be more demand for money – Keynes’ “unsatisfied fringe of borrowers”.   
 
This allows a monetarist-creditist synthesis, which describes economic growth as a 
function of the supply of bank and central bank credit. According to equation (6), the high 
growth of the 1980s in Japan would be explained as resulting from high credit growth. 
Since credit was also used for non-GDP transactions (especially speculative loans to the 
real estate sector), and much of these loans turned into bad debts in the early 1990s, banks 
increasingly became risk-averse. This restricted the supply of credit, also to borrowers that 
use the purchasing power for GDP-based transactions (consumption, investment). As a 
result, economic growth declined. The credit shrinkage also resulted in shrinkage of 
nominal GDP. While credit creation remains weak, equation (6) tells us that GDP growth 
cannot recover significantly.   
 
In this situation neither lowering interest rates is useful (as it does not increase the supply 
of credit from risk-averse banks), nor increasing fiscal stimulation (as pure fiscal policy 
does not create credit): The findings of this model apply in this testable modification. Thus, 
without an increase in MR, there cannot be an increase in nominal GDP: 
 
(8)  ∆MR = 0 
 
(9)  ∆(PRY) = ∆c + ∆i + ∆g + ∆nx 
 
(10)  ∆g = – (∆c + ∆i + ∆nx) 
 
In this framework, just as proposed by the early quantity theory literature, fiscal policy 
cannot affect nominal GDP growth, if it is not linked to the monetary side of the economy: 
an increase in credit creation is necessary (and sufficient) for nominal growth. 
 
To test the above framework empirically in the case of Japan in the 1990s, we first note 
that in practice credit creation used for GDP transactions cannot be expected to have been 
precisely zero during the 1990s. There were periods of significant credit growth (such as 
in 1996), but also of credit contraction. Thus the more general formulation of the model,   19
with  
 
 (11)  ∆MR > 0 
 
is required. Substituting (9) and (10) into equation (7), we obtain the testable proposition: 
 
 (12)  ∆(c + i + nx)  =  V∆MR  –  ∆g 
 
whereby the coefficient for ∆g is expected to be approximately –1. In other words, given 
the amount of credit creation produced by the banking system and the central bank, an 
autonomous increase in government expenditure g must result in an equal reduction in 
private demand. As the government issues bonds to fund increased fiscal stimulation, 
private sector investors (such as life insurance companies) that purchase the bonds must 
withdraw purchasing power elsewhere from the economy. The same applies (more visibly) 
to tax-financed government spending. With unchanged credit creation, every yen in 
additional government spending reduces private sector activity by one yen. 
 
We observe a different kind of crowding out than postulated by Keynesian or Ricardian 
models: Unlike the Keynesian interest rate-based crowding out, and like Ricardian 
equivalence, it is quantity-based and does not require any particular movement in interest 
rates. It therefore fits the observation of the 1990s that interest rates did not rise. Unlike 
Ricardian equivalence, it does not depend on restrictive assumptions about unobservable 
expectations and their formation. Moreover, it does not operate via a change in household 
savings. Instead, crowding out occurs due to the lack of new purchasing power supplied 
by the financial system (credit creation).   
 
The policy advice of this model is clear – and uncontroversial. As Blinder and Solow 
(1973:323) pointed out, there “is no controversy over government spending financed by 
printing money. Both sides agree that it will be expansionary”. In the terms of our 
modified pre-Keynesian model: The Japanese authorities would need to increase credit 
creation, in order to stimulate growth. This can be done via fiscal policy that is funded by 
credit creation or other measures, as will be briefly discussed below. 
 
 
(b) Empirical Evaluation 
A model of nominal GDP growth 
We proceed to test the above explanation of fiscal policy ineffectiveness. In line with the   20
general-to-specific empirical methodology, our empirical evaluation should also begin 
with a general model of nominal GDP growth that includes the variables suggested by 
alternative approaches, including the money supply and interest rates. This general model 
is then sequentially reduced to the parsimonious form, which parsimoniously encompasses 
the alternative models (see Hendry and Mizon, 1978; Hendry, 2000). We formulate a 
general ADL model of nominal GDP, based on quarterly statistics: 
 
(13)   ∆GDPt=  αj  +  Σβj∆GDPt-j-1  +  Σγj∆MRt-j  +  Σδj∆WPI t-j    +  Σφj∆MS t-j     
      +   Σωj∆HPM t-j    +  Σρj∆Short t-j    +  Στj∆Long t-j    +  Σϕj∆ODR t-j   +  εt 
 
All variables are in year-on-year percentage differences, with   
GDP = nominal GDP 
MR = Credit used for GDP transactions   
WPI = Wholesale Price Index 
MS = Money Supply, M2+CD 
HPM = High Powered Money 
Short = Call Rate 
Long = 10 year JGB yield 
ODR = Official Discount Rate 
 
First, the degree of integration of the variables is tested. Using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots, it is found that all series, except interest rates, are SI(1,1). 
The seasonally differenced natural logarithms are used for the initial general regression 
model, using the PC-Give software. We then sequentially drop the insignificant variables, 
while explicitly testing for the validity of these restrictions. The final parsimonious model 
resulting from this process is (t statistics in parentheses): 
 
 
(14)  ∆GDPt  =  0.004j  +  0.327∆GDPt-1  +   0.222∆GDPt-3   +  0.407∆M Rt   +  εt 
(1.71)  (2.53)   (2.10)   (4.08) 
 
The results are reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4.    Estimation Results of GDP Model 
The estimation sample is: 1990 (1) to 2000 (4); Dependent variable: ∆nGDP 
 Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-value      t-prob.  Part.R^2 
Constant  0.00381350     0.002228      1.71     0.095     0.0683 
∆nGDP_1      0.326688       0.1293       2.53     0.016     0.1376 
∆nGDP_3      0.222120       0.1059       2.10     0.042     0.0991 
∆MR           0.406689      0.09980       4.08     0.000     0.2934 
 
Sigma   0.00995221  RSS   0.00396186124 
R^2   0.88463   F(3,40)  =  102.2  [0.000]** 
log-likelihood  142.502   DW   1.87 
no. of obsv.  44    no. of parameters  4 
mean(∆nGDP) 0.0211887  var(nGDPYoY)  0.000780463 
 
AR  1-3  test:      F(3,37)   =  0.45124  [0.7179]  hetero  test:      F(6,33)    =  0.20716  [0.9721] 
ARCH  1-3  test:    F(3,34)  =  0.93630  [0.4338]  hetero-X  test:    F(9,30)    =  0.55406  [0.8229] 
Normality  test:   Chi^2(2)   =  0.13829  [0.9332]  RESET  test:     F(1,39)  =  0.000462  [0.9830] 
 
 
The usual statistical diagnostics show that there are no significant problems with the 
formulation. Furthermore, cointegration tests confirmed that the dependent and 
explanatory variables were cointegrated, ruling out a spurious correlation. Formal tests for 
encompassing found that the credit model encompasses alternative theories. In Figure 1 
we show the raw data for nominal GDP growth and the key explanatory variable, credit 
creation used for GDP transactions (∆MR). The close correlation of the raw (not fitted) 
data is visible by eye inspection. Explicit Granger causality tests found that credit 
Granger-causes nominal GDP growth, but there was no causality in the opposite direction. 
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Figure 1. Credit creation used for GDP transactions (MR) and nominal GDP growth in 
Japan. Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, and Bank of Japan 
 
 
Testing the fiscal policy ineffectiveness proposition 
We now proceed to test the fiscal policy ineffectiveness proposition of our model. 
Substituting the empirical formulation of nominal GDP, as shown in equation (14) into 
equation (9) and solving for non-government demand, we obtain: 
 
 (15)    ∆(ct+it+nxt) = β1  + β2∆GDPt-1 + β3∆GDPt-1 +  β4∆MRt + β5∆gt + εt 
 
If we have found suitable empirical proxies for our model, a regression would yield the 
following coefficient for government expenditure: 
  
  (16)  β5   =  –1 
 
We use year-on-year changes of all variables. Figure 2 shows changes in government 
spending and private demand. Eye inspection indicates that there is some form of negative 
correlation. The results of our regression are shown in Table 5.   
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Figure 2.  Nominal private demand and government expenditure, absolute growth rates. 
Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 
 
Table 5.    Estimation Results of Private Demand Model 
The estimation sample is: 1990 (1) to 2000 (4); Dependent variable: ∆private 
 Coefficient  Std.  error  t-value      t-prob.  Part.R^2 
Constant  430.797        323.8       1.33     0.191     0.0434 
∆nGDP_1      0.369348       0.1275         2.90      0.006     0.1770 
∆nGDP_3      0.203399       0.1110       1.83     0.075     0.0792 
∆MR           0.0151281     0.004390      3.45     0.001     0.2334 
∆G  -0.956970      0.2057      -4.65     0.000     0.3570 
Sigma    1233.28    RSS    59317732.9 
R^2   0.823256      F(3,40)  =  45.41  [0.000]** 
log-likelihood -372.946      DW    1.77 
no. of obsv.  44    no. of parameters  5 
mean (∆private) 1406.38    var  (∆private) 1406.38 
 
Solved static long-run equation for ∆private: 
 Coefficient  Std.  error  t-value      t-prob. 
Constant  430.797        323.8       1.33     0.191    
∆nGDP        0.572747       0.1048       5.46     0.000 
∆MR           0.0151281     0.004390      3.45     0.001    
∆G  -0.956970      0.2057      -4.65     0.000    
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Long-run sigma = 1233.28 
ECM = ∆private - 430.797 + 0.95697*∆G - 0.572747*∆nGDP - 0.0151281*∆MR; 
WALD test: Chi^2(3) = 179.476 [0.0000] ** 
AIC  14.3415   SC    14.5443 
HQ  14.4167   FPE    1.69380e+006 
When the log-likelihood constant is included: 
AIC                   17.1794  SC                    17.3821 
H Q                     1 7 . 2 5 4 6   F P E               2 . 8 9 2 9 3 e + 0 0 7  
 
 
AR 1-3 test:    F-form F(3,36)  =    0.58896 [0.6262] 
ARCH  1-3  test:    F(3,33)    =   1.4770  [0.2387]   
Normality  test:   Chi^2(2)   =    0.68778  [0.7090]     
hetero  test:    (8,30)    =   1.5833  [0.1717]   
hetero-X  test:   F(14,24)   =      1.7418  [0.1123]   
RESET  test:   F(1,38)   =    0.056661  [0.8131]     
Skewness                -0.17285 
Excess  Kurtosis           -0.025167 
Asymptotic  test:   Chi^2(2)   =    0.22026  [0.8957] 
 
 
The coefficient for government expenditure (β5) is –0.95697. Rounding to one digit, we 
obtain:  
 
 β 5 = –1.0.   
 
Evaluation 
The test suggests that for every yen in government spending that is not monetised (i.e. not 
supported by credit creation), private demand shrank by one yen. The empirical evidence 
supports the contention of the pre-Keynesian economists that an economic recovery 
requires monetary expansion, here defined as credit creation. The pre-Keynesian model, in 
modified form, appears to fit the Japanese experience of the 1990s, in preference to 
alternative explanations.   
 
Possible objection 
There is a possible objection to this empirical finding: causality may run from private 
demand to government spending, not the other way round. In other words, while it is 
suggested here that increased government expenditure has crowded out private 
expenditure through laying claim on the limited amount of credit available, the 
government expenditure may have responded perfectly to declines or rises in private 
demand, in order to maintain stable growth.     25
 
However, there are a number of serious problems with this argument: In this case, the 
government would have to have perfect knowledge of current gross domestic expenditure, 
and be able to react simultaneously, during the same quarter, by adjusting government 
expenditure. However, GDP statistics are only available long after the end of the current 
quarter. Furthermore, government expenditure is the result of a somewhat complex 
bureaucratic procedure, which involves budgets drawn up by the Ministry of Finance and 
the government, which are approved by the Diet. There is no empirical evidence that this 
process has been fast enough to accommodate potential current-quarter changes in 
spending needs. More often than not, politicians appear happy if they can respond within 
the same fiscal year to perceived changes in public spending needs. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most damaging to this alternative explanation, if the government expenditure did not in 
fact crowd out private demand, as suggested by our credit model, but instead the 
government counteracted changes in private demand perfectly, then this argument would 
imply that government expenditure was, after all, effective in changing total output and 
employment. If that was the case, then why did the government, apparently well-informed 
and infinitely fast in its short-term spending policies, not use its allegedly highly 
stimulatory fiscal policy to achieve the declared government policy goal of stimulating an 
economic recovery? If fiscal policy had the desired effects, as this argument suggest, and 
could counteract any change in private demand, then why did the government use it to 
create negative nominal GDP in 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002? Why did the government 
implement a contraction of nominal GDP by over 1% in those years? A large number of 
auxiliary assumptions – most of them highly implausible – are required to rescue this 
counter-argument. The fundamental principle of parsimony suggests that the proposed 
explanation should be considered preferable. 
 
(c) Policy Implications 
The finding suggests that Japanese fiscal policy has been ineffective during the 1990s, 
because it was not supported by monetary policy. The central bank could act to increase 
credit creation, and hence stimulate the economy, by raising its net open market purchase 
operations. For instance, the Bank of Japan could have sufficiently increased its bond 
purchases.
30  Policies to stimulate bank credit creation could also have been adopted. Here, 
the central bank could have been more helpful, for instance by utilizing its unique status to 
                                                 
30  Hayashi (1998) argues that the central bank is essentially an agency that certain functions have been delegated to by the 
government. In this case it does not make sense for the government to issue bonds and pay interest for its borrowing, if it 
could instead ask the central bank to print money and pay for fiscal policy through costless, interest free money creation. 
Hence the government could “exchange interest-bearing government bonds with interest free reserves through the central 
bank’s purchase of government bonds”, as paraphrased by Okina (1999, p. 172).   26
solve the bad debt problem. Given these findings, it appears central bank policy has not 
been as helpful as it could have been. The lack of incentives to coordinate monetary policy 
with the government’s fiscal policy may be one of the disadvantages of central bank 
independence.
31  
 
There is a policy for governments to monetise fiscal policy even without cooperation from 
the central bank. The method, first suggested by Werner (1996, 1998, 2000a, 2000b) 
renders fiscal policy effective, according to the above model. Without the cooperation of 
the central bank, money-financed fiscal policy is not an option. However, credit-financed 
fiscal policy is possible: the Ministry of Finance could cover the public sector borrowing 
requirement by substituting bond finance with borrowing from the private sector 
commercial banks. This would increase credit creation and, according to the above model, 
stimulate the economy. 
 
There are objections to this proposal. Hawtrey, before the Macmillan Committee of 1930, 
“considered the ‘radical’ idea of government spending out of new bank credit, but 
predicted that the result of such a policy would be inflationary, and a threat to the gold 
standard, thus forcing up the bank rate of interest and causing credit contraction. [It]… 
would mean the end of cheap money for free enterprise.”
32  However, Hawtrey’s objection 
is predicated on the assumptions that (a) the market for credit is in equilibrium, so that 
interest rates respond proportionately to an increase in the demand for credit; and/or (b) 
that banks are merely financial intermediaries that cannot create new credit, so that any 
extension of bank loans to the government must be at the expense of bank lending to 
alternative uses. However, both assumptions are unlikely to hold: the theoretical literature 
has provided ample arguments for the case of a rationed credit market, whereby interest 
rates do not respond proportionately to changes in the demand for money. Furthermore, 
the institutional reality of banking systems allows banks to create new purchasing power 
without withdrawing existing purchasing power from other parts of the economy. 
Empirically, the Japanese example has also disproved Hawtrey’s assumptions: Using 
Japanese data, no evidence can be found that interest rates are in an inverse relationship 
with the quantity of bank loans extended. Furthermore, Japanese banks currently have 
excess reserves of over Y30 trn with the central bank, and they continue to reduce bank 
lending. They have ample opportunity to increase lending without withdrawing loans from 
                                                 
31  Independence is not necessarily an obstacle, since a central bank can voluntarily cooperate to support the government’s 
policy. As Bernanke (2000) pointed out, “Cooperation with the fiscal authorities in pursuit of a common goal is not the same 
as subservience” (p. 163). Unfortunately, there are few examples of such cooperation by independent central banks. 
32  Klein (1968), as quoted by Spencer and Yohe (1970:15). It is not made explicit who had launched this ‘radical idea’. 
However, there is some evidence that it may have emerged from the German credit school of economists. It is noteworthy 
that this ‘radical’ idea was successfully implemented in Germany in the 1930s.     27
current borrowers.   
 
Thus funding of fiscal expenditure by borrowing from banks would increase credit 
creation and hence the total amount of purchasing power in the economy. As a result, MR 
in equation (7) above would rise, which would, in turn, boost nominal GDP. By shifting 
government funding away from bond finance and replacing it with borrowing from the 
commercial banks via simple loan contracts, credit creation will be stimulated.
33 Unlike 
bond markets, banks create new purchasing power when they lend. This means that overall 
economic activity can be boosted (via fiscal policy), without any quantity crowding out 
that rendered fiscal policy ineffective during the 1990s.
34 
 
Figures 3 and 4 are used to illustrate the difference between stimulatory fiscal policy – 
here the example of a fiscal spending package – funded via bond issuance taken up by 
investors, such as life insurers, and stimulatory fiscal policy that is backed by credit 
creation.  
 
 
　
Ministry of Finance
(no credit creation)
Funding 
via
bond 
issuance
Fiscal 
stimulus
Net Effect = Zero
Non-bank private sector
　 (no credit creation）
　　　　
Fiscal stimulation funded by bond issuance
(e.g. : ¥20trn government spending package)
-¥20trn +¥20trn
 
Figure 3.  
                                                 
33  This is effectively the policy combination adopted by the Reichsbank from 1933 to 1937. Its President, Hjalmar Schacht, 
appeared to have been well aware of the quantity crowding out problem of unmonetised fiscal policy. In addition to stepping 
up the credit creation of the Reichsbank (by purchasing various forms of assets, including government bonds and bonds of 
other government institutions), Schacht instructed the establishment of government institutions that implemented fiscal 
spending programmes and were funded by the issuance of bills of exchange that were purchased by the banks and the 
central bank. Funding fiscal expenditure with money creation, as opposed to public bond auctions is called ‘silent funding’ 
(geraeuschlose Finanzierung) in the German tradition. 
34  The Werner (1996, 1998) proposal is supported and seconded by economists such as Congdon (2001), Smithers (2001) 
and the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf (2002).   28
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Figure 4.  
 
 
Although the central government funded parts of the 1998 budget from banks, this has 
remained negligible. With the majority of bond issuance taken up by the non-bank private 
sector (which does not have the power to create credit), fiscal spending had to crowd out 
private activity. 
 
 
4. Conclusion and Further Research  
The proposed alternative model has provided an answer to the question why fiscal policy 
has appeared ineffective during the 1990s. The empirical findings presented in this paper 
indicate that, given unchanged monetary conditions, fiscal policy and domestic demand 
may be inversely related. There appears to be evidence for complete crowding out of fiscal 
expenditure, even in situations where interest rates do not rise. The crowding out 
transmission mechanism does not operate via interest rates, but the quantity of purchasing 
power claimed by the government.   
 
The proposed framework creates common ground between proponents of Keynesian views 
(as held, among others, by Blinder and Solow), monetarist views (as held in particular by 
Milton Friedman) and those of leading contemporary macroeconomists (such as Mankiw). 
   29
The implication for the present government expenditure packages are that private demand 
is likely to be crowded out, as bond issuance rises substantially. Thus the unintended 
consequence of the government’s well-intentioned initiative may be to trigger a significant 
downturn in private sector demand and hence the overall economy: in the case where 
government expenditure is used to substitute for past losses (in the form of unrealized 
losses on bank balance sheets), there will not even be the gross stimulating effect of 
government expenditure policies, and hence only a net negative effect of the crowding out. 
 
Put simply, the government is draining money from the private sector and uses it to plug 
the holes in banks’ balance sheets. Ceteris paribus this will reduce economic growth. 
 
There is a solution, however, which would enable the government to achieve its goal to 
support the economy, without negative side-effects on private demand. Two possibilities 
exist, listed in preferred order: 
1.  Instead of the government, all measures to support the banking system through 
asset and equity purchases, as well as compensation for depositors, etc. should be 
defrayed by the central bank for its own account, and not become a liability of the 
government. In addition to avoiding increased national debt and the compounding 
interest on it, this would not result in any crowding out of private demand (see 
Werner, 2005). 
2.  If politically, the above option is unrealistic, a second-best option would be for the 
government to undertake the fiscal expenditures, but not fund them through the 
issuance of bonds or bills. Instead, a syndicated loan should be arranged from the 
banking system. This may sound counter-intuitive: the government would be 
borrowing from banks to give money to banks. However, such a programme would 
increase bank credit creation, and hence not crowd out private demand, whereas 
bond issuance is likely to. 
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